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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

TENTH AMENDMENT -

STATE SOVEREIGNTY -

The Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal statute
requiring state chief law enforcement officers to conduct
background investigations on potential handgun purchasers was
unconstitutional because it encroached upon the rights reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
In 1993, Congress enacted the Handgun Violence Prevention Act
("Brady Act" or "Act"),1 amending the Gun Control Act of 1968
("GCA'). 2 The GCA had established procedures for regulating the
transfer and distribution of firearms.3 To supplement the provisions
of the GCA, Congress passed the Brady Act, a statute that requires
the Attorney General to establish a national system to facilitate
background checks on potential weapons purchasers. 4 Due to the
time needed to implement the national background check system,
the Act included interim provisions aimed at regulating the
purchase and transfer of firearms. 5 These interim provisions
1. The Brady Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1976 & Supp. 1998). The Brady Act was named for
James Brady, former White House Press Secretary to President Ronald Reagan. Dick Kaukas,
Brady Still Has Scars, Nightmares from Shooting, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY),
Oct. 21, 1997, at 01B. Brady suffered brain damage and partial paralysis due to a head wound
he received from a gun fired by John W. Hinckley, Jr. in a failed attempt to assassinate
President Reagan on March 30, 1981. Id. President Reagan, a Secret Service agent, and a
District of Columbia police officer were also seriously injured in the incident. Almanac,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 30, 1997, at A02. Both Brady and his wife, Sarah, lobbied Congress in favor of
more stringent gun control legislation. Nightmares, supra, at 01B.
2. The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (1976 & Supp. 1998).
3. The Brady Act makes it unlawful for a person, common or contract carrier,
importer, manufacturer, or firearms dealer to knowingly transport, deliver, or transfer a
firearm or ammunition to a person who is:
(1) [u]nder indictment for, or has been convicted ..
of, any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, (2) is a fugitive from justice; (3) is an
unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any controlled substance ... ; and (4)
has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any medical
institution....
18 U.S.C.A. § 921(d), (g) (1976 & Supp. 1998).
4. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2368 (1997). The Act specified that the
national background check system be fully operational by November 30, 1998. Id.
5. Id. Until the national background check system was in place, the Attorney General
was required to establish a system of background checks that required a firearms dealer to:
(1) receive from the transferee a statement (the Brady Form), § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I),
containing the name, address and date of birth of the proposed transferee along with
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establised three criteria for the regulation of any transfer or sale of
handguns by firearms dealers to potential customers. 6 The criteria
include: (1) firearms dealers must receive a completed Brady Form
from the purchaser,' (2) dealers must verify the purchaser's
identification,8 and (3) dealers must provide the chief law
enforcement officer ("CLEO") for the county or state with a copy
of the purchaser's Brady Form.9 Before completing a sales
transaction, the dealer was required to wait five business days,
unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the sale could be
consummated earlier. 10
Jay Printz ("Printz"), County Sheriff for Ravalli County, Montana,
and Richard Mack ("Mack"), County Sheriff for Graham County,
Arizona, separately challenged the constitutionality of these interim
provisions requiring state CLEOs to process background checks.1'
In his suit, Printz sought to enjoin 12 implementation of the interim
enforcement provisions. 13 The United States District Court for the
District of Montana found the mandatory interim provisions
unconstitutional, but concluded that these procedures were
severable from the remainder of the Act.' 4 The district court held
that a voluntary background check system was constitutional,
however. 15
a sworn statement that the transferee is not among any of the classes of prohibited
purchasers, § 922(s)(3); (2) verify the identity of the transferee by examining an
identification document, § 922 (s)(1)(A)(i)(1); and (3) provide the 'chief law
enforcement officer' (CLEO) of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents
(and a copy) of the Brady Form, §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(ll) and (IV).
Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2368-69; The Brady Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1976 & Supp. 1998).
6. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368; The Brady Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922.
7. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I). The Brady Form requires
the purchaser's name, address, date of birth, and a sworn statement that the purchaser is not
a member of the prohibited class of purchasers as defined by section 922(s)(3). 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(s)(3).
8. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(l)(A)(i)(I). Verification is
accomplished by examining an identification document. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369; 18
U.S.C.A- § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(ll).
9. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IJJ) and (IV). The Brady Act
provides two alternatives to its regulatory process. A dealer may sell a handgun immediately
to a purchaser if. (1) the purchaser bears a state handgun permit that was issued subsequent
to a state background check, or (2) if the state conducts an instant background check. 18
U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(1)(C) and (D).
10. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369; 18 U.S.C.A- § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IlI) and (IV).
11. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
12. Id. To "enjoin" is "[t]o require a [party], by writ of injunction, to perform, or to
abstain or desist from, some act." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 529 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Similarly, in Mack's action, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona held that the compulsory background checks
were unconstitutional. 16 Mack and Printz each appealed their
respective district court decisions to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 17 After consolidating 8 the cases, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding the interim provisions constitutional.19 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 20 and
2
subsequently reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. '
Justice Scalia authored the opinion for a majority of five justices,
holding that the interim provisions requiring state and local CLEOs
to perform federal background checks were unconstitutional. 22 The
majority examined: (1) the historical basis for the allocation of
powers between the states and the federal government, (2) the
Constitution's structure, and (3) Supreme Court precedents, and
determined that the provisions commanding state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers violated the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.23
To establish a context for mandating state officials to perform
acts pursuant to federal law, the Court analyzed several statutes
enacted by the first Congresses. 24 These statutes required states to
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369. "Consolidation" is the combining of two or more
separate actions "into one trial and judgment, by order of a court where all the actions"
concern the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 309 (6th ed.
1990).
19. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
20. Id. "Certiorari" is a common law writ issued by a superior court (most frequently,
the Supreme Court of the United States) to a trial or appellate court, commanding the lower
court to certify and return the record to the superior court for review. BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
22. Id. at 2368. Justice Scalia was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as
well as Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Thomas also filed
separate concurring opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice Souter also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined. Id.
23. Id. at 2370; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922, Pub. L No. 103-159, 103 Stat. 2074 (codified as
amended by Pub. Law No. 103-322, in the note following the Brady Act). Id. State law
enforcement officers were directed to temporarily administer the federally-enacted regulatory
program. Id. The interim provisions required firearms dealers to send Brady Forms to CLEOs
within five days of submission. Id. CLEOs are required to make a reasonable effort to
determine whether the sale would be lawful under The Gun Control Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 921.
24. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:493

record citizenship applications 25 and naturalization records, 26 as
well as to register aliens. 2 After analyzing these mandates, the
Court concluded that these obligations applied only to states that
authorized their courts to conduct these proceedings. Moreover, the
Court determined that although Congress does not have the power
to impose executive obligations upon the states, a state may
consent to perform acts pursuant to federal direction if the
28
mandate directly implements the Constitution.
Attempting to determine the Constitution's original meaning, the
Court first analyzed The Federalist Papers.29 After reviewing The
Federalist Nos. 2730 and 45,31 the majority rejected the
government's contention that the Framers originally intended to
force state officials to execute federal laws.3 2 Instead, the Court
cited its decision in FERC v. Mississippi33 to demonstrate that the
government's reliance upon state courts for assistance was not
25. Id. Congress passed the Act of Mar. 26, 1790, which required state courts to record
applications for citizenship. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
26. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370. The Act of June 18, 1798, required state courts to
transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other naturalization records to the
Secretary of State. See Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567 (1798).
27. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370. The Act of Apr. 14 1802, compelled the state courts to
register aliens seeking naturalization and issue certificates of registry. See Act of Apr. 14,
1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-55 (1802).
28. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371-72. The Court determined that the early laws indeed
placed federal obligations upon state judges, but only to the extent to which these
procedures related to judicial review. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255
(1957). The Court pointed to the Extradition Act of 1793 as a federal law that directly
imposes a duty upon states to implement federal policy. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371-72. The
Extradition Clause of Article IV, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: "A Person
charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and
be found in another State, shall on Demand of the Executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
29. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court stated that The Federalist Papers were
indicative of the original meaning the Framers ascribed to the provisions of the Constitution.
Id.
30. The FederalistNo. 27 (Hamilton).
31. The FederalistNo. 45 (Madison).
32. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. The government contended that The Federalist Nos. 27
and 45, written by Hamilton and Madison, respectively, establish:
[A] general observation of the Constitution would 'enable the [national] government to
employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws' . . . and
that it was 'extremely probable that in other instances, particularly in the organization
of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed in the correspondent
authority of the Union.'
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. See The Federalist No. 27 (Hamilton); The Federalist No. 45
(Madison).
33. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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based on the federal government's power to bind state courts, but
on the assumption that the states would consent to assist the
federal government.34 The Court also rejected the government's
view that under the rationale of The Federalist No. 27 and the
Supremacy Clause,35 the Framers intended the federal government
to have the power to compel the states to enforce federal laws. 36
Reiterating the holding of New York v. United States,37 the Court
held that state officials are not subject to federal direction, and
3
therefore, are not required to implement federal laws. 8
The Court completed its review of statutes by analyzing
executive-commandeering statutes.39 Until modem times, Congress
had enacted few such commandeering statutes. 40 In support of its
argument, the government cited the Act of May 18, 1917, a World
War I draft statute that granted the President the authority to
utilize the services of state departments, and provided a penalty for
a state's refusal.41 The majority viewed this act's penalty provision
34. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2373. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796 (1982).
35. U.S. CONsT. art. VI., § 2. ("[T]he laws of the United States... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land....").
36. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380.
37. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
38. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2373. The court referred to The Federalist No. 27, which
provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which
all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State will be bound by the
sanctity of an oath. Thus, the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective
members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as
its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.
The FederalistNo. 27 (Hamilton). Justice Souter used this passage as the foundation for his
dissent, stating that: "(1) federal laws will be supreme; (2) all state officers will be
oath-bound to observe those laws; and thus, (3) state officers will be 'incorporated' and
'rendered auxiliary.'" Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2373. The majority criticized two aspects of Souter's
analysis. Id. First, if the Court had followed Justice Souter's interpretation of the passage
that reads, "incorporated into the operations of the national government and rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws," it would mean that state officials must take an
active role without the necessity for a congressional directive. Id. Second, reading the
passage from Justice Souter's view would subject state legislatures to federal direction. Id.
See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that state legislatures are
not subject to federal direction).
39. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375.
40. Id. The government pointed to the Act of August 3, 1882 that enlists state officials
in the administration of local immigration affairs. Id. See Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§ 2,
4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). The majority pointed out that this Act did not mandate duties to state
officials, but merely empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to enter into contracts with
state officials. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375.
41. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375. See Act of August 3, 1882, ch. §§ 2, 4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
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as a limiting power, precluding the federal government from forcing
states to carry out the laws of the nation.42 In its analysis of
executive-commandeering statutes, the Court also reviewed several
federal statutes requiring state or local officials to implement
federal regulatory schemes.4 The Court construed these statutes as
generally connected to federal funding measures, which require
that the states participate in the scheme before they can receive
federal funding.4
After rejecting all historical arguments supporting the
government's position that state officials must enforce federal laws,
the Court next examined the government's argument that the
Constitution's structure provided a legitimate basis for allowing
state enforcement.4 5 The Framers originally established a system of
"dual sovereignty" in the American Constitution - the states
surrendered some of their rights and powers to the federal
government. 46 It is well established that the states retain the rights
not granted to the federal government, reflecting a "residuary and
inviolable sovereignty."47 This system is furthered by the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides, "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." 48 Citing New York, the Court reaffirmed the notion that
"[tihe Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States."4 9 Justice
Scalia reviewed the Court's decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,50 which held that the American system of dual
sovereignty is a system in which two governmental forms operate,
each protected from incursions by the other, allowing each to
42. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375. The subsequent history of the Act of May 18, 1917
reveals that the President did not commandeer state officers, but rather, requested the
assistance of state governors. See Proclamation of May 18, 1917, ch.15, § 6, 40 Stat. 1665
(1917).
43. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
44. Id. The Court held that the statutes in question have a limited impact upon the
issue before the Court, and therefore, these statutes were not necessary for the decision of
this case. Id. The Court, however, mentioned that the provisions in the statutes would only
bind the states to the extent that they were willing to participate in the regulatory program.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. See The FederalistNo. 39 (Madison).
48. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
49. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 161-66.
50. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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provide its own direction, privity, and a set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people governed by it.51
The Court then discussed Madison's idea of "double security" to
establish the division of power between the federal and state
governments. 2 In the instant case, the majority stated that "double
security" affects the separation and equilibrium among the three
branches of the federal government.> Illustrating this point, the
majority recognized that the Brady Act effectively transferred the
responsibility of the President to "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed" to thousands of CLEOs in the fifty states.54
In analyzing the interim provisions' constitutionality, the majority
refused to hold that the Necessary and Proper Clausem granted the
federal government the power to impose duties upon the several
states.6 The Court found that the Tenth Amendment cannot be
narrowly interpreted to prohibit only the exercise of delegated
powers not authorized to the United States.57 Rather, the Tenth
Amendment imposes a limitation upon the delegated powers
themselves.- Furthermore, the Court held that the combination of
the Commerce Clause 9 with the Necessary and Proper Clause was
51. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995).
52. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378. The Court referred to The Federalist No. 51, which
provides, in pertinent part:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct government..-and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises
to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.
The FederalistNo. 51 (Madison).
53. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
54. Id. See also U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8., cl. 18. (This section provides, in part, that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper....").
56. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The dissent
defended the ultra vires congressional action in the Necessary and Proper Clause in its
attempt to persuade the Court into adopting the constitutionality of the interim provisions.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
57. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
58. Id. The Court defused the dissent's argument that Congress would have the power
to regulate the sale of guns if the Tenth Amendment was combined with the Commerce
Clause and art. I, § 8, of the United States Constitution. Id. The dissent believed that this
combination would render the interim provisions constitutional because the Tenth
Amendment does not prohibit the exercise of delegated powers. Id. Rather, it "merely
prohibits the exercise of powers 'not delegated to the United States.'" Id.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States..

").
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not sufficient to find the interim provisions constitutional. 6° The
Court instead declared that the Necessary and Proper Clause, not
the Tenth Amendment, defeats this proposition by holding that a
61
law that violates state sovereignty is no law at all.
After reviewing Article VIs Supremacy Clause and Oaths of
Office, the majority concluded that when state executive and
judicial officers take an oath to be bound to uphold the
Constitution and laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution, the
62
oath does not bind the officials to all laws enacted by Congress.
Specifically, the Court refused to hold that the application of the
Supremacy Clause presumes that all laws enacted by Congress are
constitutional. 63 A law enacted by Congress, but found
unconstitutional by the Court, could not be upheld under the
umbrella of the Supremacy Clause, and if the Clause were
interpreted otherwise, the reasoning would, in effect, be circular. 64
In its analysis of whether, under the Constitution, Congress may
compel a state officer to execute a federal law, the Court focused
on its past decisions. 65 The first time the Court addressed this issue
was during the 1970's when Congress, through the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), required states to prescribe auto
emissions testing, monitoring, and retrofit programs, as well as
designate preferential treatment for buses and car pools. 66 The
United States District Courts for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
avoided the constitutional question by invalidating the regulations
on statutory grounds. 67 Under similar circumstances, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit held the
EPA Regulatory Act both unconstitutional and statutorily unsound.68
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
60. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
61. Id. The majority found:
[wihen a 'la[w] . . . for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the
principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions. . . is
not a '(l]a[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause' and is
thus, in the words of The Federalist,'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which deserve[s]
to be treated as such.
Id. See The FederalistNo. 33 (Hamilton).
62. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
64. Id. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cls. 2, 3.
65. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Maryland v. EPA, 530 F2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); and Brown v. EPA, 521 F2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975).
68. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378 (citing District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)).
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constitutional validity of the regulations, but the government
69
declined to defend the regulations and rescinded them instead.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc.,70 the Court determined that the federal government may not
compel the states to implement federal regulatory programs by
legislative or executive action.7' The New York Court had held that
the federal government may not compel the states to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program. 72 In the present case, the
government relied on Testa v. Katt,73 in which the Court held that,
under the Supremacy Clause, state courts cannot refuse to apply
federal law.v4 The Printz majority found no foundation for this
proposition because the Supremacy Clause does not mention
75
whether state executive officers must administer federal law.
In Printz, the government contended that the holding in New
York was not violated because the minute tasks delegated to the
CLEOs did not diminish the accountability of federal officials. 76 The
Court pronounced that the inability of handgun purchasers to
recognize the federal government as the entity that rejected their
handgun requests, unconstitutionally shifted accountability from the
federal government to the state official. 77 To explain further its
rejection of the government's interpretation of New York, the Court
stated that when the Brady Act interim provisions are applied, it is
likely that CLEOs will be the only officials standing between a
dealer and a purchaser. 78 The federal government is completely
unaccountable.7 9
The government contended that the CLEOs' great administrative
importance offsets the small burden placed upon them, and
therefore, the interim procedures should be found valid, at least on
a temporary basis.80 The Court categorically rejected this position,
69. Id. at 2378 (citing EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)). Before the Court could
decide these cases, the Court had to vacate the opinions and remand them for a
consideration of mootness. Id.
70. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
72. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
73. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
74. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
75. Id. at 2378; New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79.
76. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2383.
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stating that it is not an issue of balancing the federal objective and
the state's autonomy, rather it is a question of whether such
implementation is constitutional.81 Relying on New York, the Court
concluded that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." 2 In
applying this finding to the present case, the Court found that the
Brady Act's interim provisions requiring CLEOs to perform federal
background checks were unconstitutional.83
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's historical
analysis, finding that the Brady Act interim provisions violate the
Tenth Amendment.84 Although the majority's holding invalidated the
provisions requiring CLEOs to perform mandatory background
checks of potential owners, Justice O'Connor reiterated that a
voluntary participation in the program would be constitutionals 5
Justice O'Connor noted that the directives are only interim
provisions, scheduled to terminate on November 30, 1998.8 She
reasoned that Congress is free to amend the program and may
require CLEOs to perform the duties, if the federal government
establishes the obligations pursuant to contracts with the individual
87
states.
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
emphasized that our Constitution grants enumerated powers only
to the federal government88 Under Justice Thomas' self-styled
"revisionist view," he found that the Commerce Clause grants only
the federal government the authority to regulate commerce among
the several states; it does not extend to intrastate point of sale
81. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383. The New York Court, rejecting a "balancing test" for
constitutionality, stated:
Much of the constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government,
and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The
result may appear 'formalistic' in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue,
because such measures are typically the product of the era's perceived necessity. But
the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among
sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis
of the day.
New York, 505 U.S. at 187-88 (1992).
82. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
83. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383-84.
84. Id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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To find the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, Justice
Thomas relied on a "substantial effect" test to determine whether
Congress can require CLEOs to regulate the purchase and sale of
handguns. 9 Justice Thomas pointed out that the Constitution places
entire areas outside the scope of Congressional authority.91 In
particular, the Second Amendment appears to expressly limit
92
Congress' authority to interfere with the regulation of firearms.
Justice Thomas reasoned that if the Second Amendment is
interpreted to confer the right to "keep and bear arms" as a
constitutional protection, then the federal government's regulation
of the interstate sale or possession of firearms would be contrary
to the amendment's protection. 93
In Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, he defined the issue as
whether "Congress, acting on behalf of the people of the entire
Nation, may require local law enforcement officers to perform
certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a
federal gun control program."4 Justice Stevens found an affirmative
answer to this question, stating that the interim provisions requiring
CLEOs to perform background checks on potential handgun
purchasers were analogous to: (1) Congress requiring state agents
to collect federal taxes, and (2) Congress drafting state judges into
federal service.9 5 In essence, he found the ultimate issue was
whether Congress could require state officials to perform duties for
the federal government in times of national emergency before
federal personnel can respond.9 6 To support his finding, Justice
Stevens analyzed Congress' authority to impose regulations on state
officials as evidenced by the Constitution, early American history,
the structure of the federal government, and Court precedents.97
Justice Stevens focused on four portions of the Constitution in
developing the proposition that the Constitution itself provides the
89. Id. Justice Thomas believed the Court must "temper our Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence" and interpret the Clause in its original understanding. Id. See also Lopez v.
United States, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995).
90. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. The Second Amendment provides, in part, "the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms". U.S. CONST. amend.11.
93. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed a dissent in
which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Id.
95.

Id.

96. Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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authority for the government to impose federal obligations on state
officials 8 First, he construed Article I, section 8, clauses 3 and 18,
to support the contention that the Necessary and Proper Clause
permits the federal government to use state officials temporarily for
the implementation of federal programs.99 Article I, section 8,
clause 3, grants Congress the power to regulate Commerce among
the several states, and Article I, section 8, clause 18, gives Congress
the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government. . .. "100
Justice Stevens found that when these two clauses are combined,
Article I provides Congress with the power to delegate its power to
the states when necessary and proper.'0 1
Next, Justice Stevens read the Tenth Amendment closely, finding
that the powers granted under this Amendment did not place a
limit upon Congress' ability to enforce the laws it enacts. 1 2 The
dissent agreed with the majority's interpretation that the Ninth
Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws that are enumerated
within the Constitution, but concluded that the Tenth Amendment
has no such restriction. 0 3 Combining the Tenth Amendment with
Article VI, clause 3, of the Constitution, the dissent reasoned that
because an oath of office binds state officials, it necessarily follows
that federal law may impose duties upon state officials to enforce
against private citizens of that state. °4
Justice Stevens speculated that all congressional legislation
establishes policies for the states to follow, as if the state
legislatures had enacted the policies themselves. 10 5 To justify this
hypothesis, Justice Stevens referred to Article VI, which provides
98.
99.

Id. at 2386-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 3,

18.
100. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d1s. 3,
18.
101. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2387-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"). U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
104. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, and
U.S. CONST. amend. X (Article VI, cl. 3, provides: "all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and the several States, shall be bound, by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution. . ."; whereas, the Tenth Amendment does not regulate powers delegated
by the United States.). See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, and U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
105. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that federal law will be the supreme law of the land and it will
bind all states. 10 6 To support his finding that the interim provisions
are constitutional, Justice Stevens declared, "[tihere is not a clause,
sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the
United States that supports the proposition that a local police
officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by
Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated

in Article

I."1 07

After reviewing the Constitution, the dissent examined early
American history to find authority for the federal government to
impose federal enforcement duties on state officials. 08 Under the
Articles of Confederation, the national government had the power
to command the states, although it did not have this power over
private citizens. °9 Due to the Articles of Confederation"s
ineffectiveness, the Framers changed the national government's
character to augment its power over private citizens, as well as to
preclude claims of immunity by state officers."0
The dissent rejected the majority's finding that history reveals
Congress' lack of authority to impose nonconsensual duties upon
state officials."' Justice Stevens agreed with Hamilton's explanation
in The Federalist No. 27 that the national government derives its
power from the people and their elected officials and that this
power could be directly extended, thereby placing limitations or
expectations upon the citizens themselves."' Justice Stevens
pointed out that Hamilton's reasoning unequivocally confirmed that
state executive and judiciary officials could be required to
106. Id. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2.
107. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. See The Federalist No. 13 (Hamilton). Hamilton explained that the power of
the national government must extend to the citizens. Id. Hamilton further stated in The
FederalistNo. 27 that". . . by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual
citizens of the several States, [this] will enable the government to employ the ordinary
magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws." The Federalist No. 27 (Hamilton). He
further stated, "It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common
apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which [the state and federal
governments] might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for
securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State."
Id.
111. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. See The Federalist No. 27 in which Hamilton stated, "the power of the
government to act on 'individual citizens' - including 'employ[ing] the ordinary magistracy'
of the States - was an answer to the problems faced by a central government that could act
only directly upon the States in their political or collective capacities." Id.
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implement federal policy when the policy was within the federal
13
government's affirmative powers."
Justice Stevens refuted the majority's contention that Hamilton's
use of the Supremacy Clause suggested that the Framers did not
intend to allow the federal government to impose obligations upon
state officials. 114 He stated, "the Supremacy Clause is the source of
the obligation of state officials to implement congressional
directives"; and that this "does not remotely suggest that they might
be 'incorporated into the operations of the national government'
before their obligations have been defined by Congress."1' 5 Justice
Stevens also analyzed New York, declaring that the New York
holding does not affect the interpretation of The Federalist No.
27.116

The dissent refused to accept the majority's finding that there is
little evidence supporting the federal government's authority to
impose obligations on the states. 1 7 Justice Stevens' refusal centered
upon four early legislative enactments where the federal
government relied on the states to execute a variety of executive
functions.118 First, Congress required mandatory service by state
judges and clerks to preside over matters of citizenship
applications.1 9 Second, the Fifth Congress required state clerks to
report naturalization statistics, and imposed a fine if the obligations
were not met.120 Third, the Seventh Congress required state courts
to maintain an alien naturalization registry. 12' Fourth, Congress
passed legislation requiring state courts to certify the seaworthiness
of vessels. 122 Justice Stevens determined that performing executive
113. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); The Federalist No. 27 (Hamilton). Justice Stevens stated that "since the New York
opinion did not mention The FederalistNo. 27, it does not affect either the relevance or the
weight of the historical evidence provided by No. 27 insofar as it relates to state courts and
magistrates." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. The first Congress passed a statute that required state courts to administer a
loyalty oath to the United States, and required clerks to record the applications. The Act of
Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
120. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54
§ 2, 1 Stat. 567 (1798).
121. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28
§ 2, 2 Stat. 154-155 (1802).
122. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29
§ 3, 1 Stat. 132-133 (1790).
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functions was not unusual for state judges and clerks. 123
Furthermore, judges continue to perform federal executive
24
functions today.
The dissent found that, in light of the history of this issue, the
majority had failed to distinguish between policy decisions
influenced by state sovereignty and decisions compelled by the
Constitution. 25 To clarify this distinction, the dissent cited
President Wilson's congressionally granted authority to use state
officers to implement the military draft during World War 1.126 The
majority concluded that the power to utilize state officers in
implementing the draft was in response to Wilson's request for
state action. 27 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's finding by
emphasizing that it was not Wilson's statesmanship, but rather,
Wilson's constitutional power that allowed him to require state
28
officials to implement the draft.
Justice Stevens next reviewed the structure of the Court and
rebutted the majority's presumption that the Framers' intent to
maintain state sovereignty could prohibit federal obligations on
state employees. 29 The dissent argued that the people of the
several states elect Senators, who in turn make laws; therefore, it is
unlikely that these legislators would enact laws and ignore the
concerns of their constituents.130 Justice Stevens reasoned:
[Gliven the fact that the Members of Congress are elected by
the people of the several States, with each State receiving an
equivalent number of Senators in order to ensure that even the
smallest States have a powerful voice in the legislature, it is
quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the
sovereignty concerns of their constituents. It is far more
reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest
burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a
123. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
125. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 80-81 (1917).
127. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on the line of cases
beginning with NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), concluding that the majority's
decision in this case conflicted with such Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases
that held that federal power may be exerted over local government officials. Printz, 117 S.
Ct. at 2394. The dissent believed the same rule also should extend to legislative power. Id.
130. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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considered judgment that the people in each of the States will
13
benefit therefrom. '
The dissent concluded its structural analysis by stating that the
Framers created a system in which the Court would have the task
"of creating a working structure of intergovernmental relationships
around the framework authorized by the Constitution."13 2 Justice
Stevens found that no explicit or implicit notion was apparent from
the writings of the Framers indicating that Congress is forbidden to
impose federal duties on private citizens or local officials. 1' Justice
Stevens relied on Justice Holmes' quotation, "the machinery of
government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in
its joints" to support his conclusion that Congress has the power to
rely on state officials to perform occasional duties that are in the
nation's best interest.'1
Finally, Justice Stevens interpreted the Court's precedents as
supporting his rationale. 35 In particular, Justice Stevens referred to
New York, in which the Court held that the incentives offered by
the government to the states to implement federal programs were
not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.'36 He further noted
that in reaching its decision, the majority relied upon what Justice
Stevens characterized as "dicta" in New York. Justice Stevens
pointed out that the language used by the New York Court ("the
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program")1 37 was "wholly
unnecessary to the decision of the case," and further, that dicta
never binds the Court.13
In analyzing past decisions of the Court, Justice Stevens pointed
to three cases that he found squarely on point: Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n ("FERC") v. Mississippi, Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, and Testa v. Katt.'39 In FERC, the Court held that the
federal government could require state utility commissions to
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)).
135. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992).
137. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2398, 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2398; U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Banner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24
(1994).
139. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987); and
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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comply with federal energy standards, and that the only way states
could avoid compliance with the federal standard was to refrain
from attempting to regulate the field.' 40 Since the statute in FERC
did not set an alternative regulatory scheme, the commission had
no real "choice," but to comply with the mandate.14 1 Justice Stevens
held that the burdens placed on the state officials in FERC were
greater than the "minimal" burden required by the interim
4
provisions of the Brady Act. 1
In Branstad, the Court upheld the Extradition Act of 1793,
granting the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico the authority to
extradite a fugitive.'" It is important to note that the majority
conceded that this holding imposed duties directly upon state
executive officers.'"
The Court in Testa unanimously held that state courts must hear
federal claims brought under the Federal Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, whatever their docket schedule. 145 Justice Stevens
found that the imposition placed upon state sovereignty in Testa
was much greater than the majority's "characterization of the case
as merely holding that 'state courts can refuse to apply federal

law.'

"146

In the present case, the majority paid specific attention to the
Supremacy Clause provision that judges are bound to apply federal
law.147 The dissent suggested that if the explicit language, rather
than the central meaning, of the Supremacy Clause was afforded
the proper weight, the majority's finding that the Framers did not
intend to bind state officials was impossible.'l " Justice Stevens
pointed out that history revealed that both state and federal judges
were given the same respect as executive officials, and if the
Framers had intended to isolate executive officials, then he felt
"the learned and articulate men who fashioned the basic structure
of our government, . . . would have said so."49
Justice Stevens concluded that the Brady Act was comparable to
statutes requiring local law enforcement officers to report missing
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J.,
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J.,
Id.
Id. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 229-30.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J.,
Id. at 2400; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2400 (Stevens, J.,
Id.
Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

dissenting). See FERC, 456 U.S. at 742.
dissenting).

dissenting).
(1947).
dissenting).
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children to the Department of Justice Crime Control Center, and if
Congress had created such a statute in the belief that it serves the
best interest of the nation, then the Court should respect the policy
judgment and constitutional power of Congress and hold the Brady
Act's interim provisions constitutional. 150
Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, but in
his separate dissent based his argument on The Federalist
Papers.151 Justice Souter reiterated Hamilton's proposition that the
federal government could use national law to "employ the ordinary
magistracy of each [state] in the execution of its laws," and
therefore, was authorized to bind individuals. 5 2 Hamilton also
discussed the Supremacy Clause and Article VI, clauses 2 and 3, of
the Constitution to support his view that state officials are
incorporated into the national government's operations. 1" Upon
further interpretation of The Federalist No. 27, Justice Souter
stated that he believed that Hamilton thought state officials would
support federal law as an auxiliary function, rather than exclusively
support their own or the state's choices. 1"'
Justice Souter supported his interpretation of Hamilton with a
reading of Madison's The FederalistNo. 44.155 In The FederalistNo.
44, Madison questioned why states should swear an oath to the
national Constitution, when a reciprocal oath does not bind federal
officers to uphold state governments. 1 6 Madison answered his own
question by acknowledging that although federal officers do not
apply state law, state officers apply federal law.1 7 Justice Souter
150. Id. (Justice Stevens stated that if Congress enacted a federal law requiring state
implementation instead of creating a federal agency, Congress could avoid creating an
enlarged federal bureaucracy in the interests of "cooperative federalism.").
151. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that The
Federalist No. 27 gives the government such authority. Id. (His view is supported by The
FederalistNo. 44 and is consistent with The Federalist Nos. 36 and 45).
152. Id. See The FederalistNo. 27 (Hamilton).
153. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The Federalist No. 27
(Hamilton) (Hamilton stated that "the Legislatures, Courts, and Magistrates of the respective
members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as its
just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement
of its laws.").
154. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter believed that
Hamilton meant that the state governmental machinery's auxiliary function would be used to
support federal law. Id. See also The FederalistNo. 27 (Hamilton).
155. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The Federalist No. 44
(Madison).
156. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The Federalist No. 44
(Madison).
157. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The Federalist No. 44
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then referred to The FederalistNos. 45 and 36 to demonstrate how
the Framers used the issue of tax collection to support the state
execution of a federal program. 1 1
Justice Souter concluded his examination by looking at The
FederalistNo. 27, and stated his belief that the Framers intended
the national government to exercise its commerce power and "to
require state auxiliaries to take appropriate action." 15 9 In
conclusion, Justice Souter declared that a national law requiring a
state official to enforce that law would not exceed the reach of
Congress as contemplated by Hamilton.Ir °
Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent, but in his separate
dissent added that the Court should look to European nations to
decide whether states should implement federal law.'6' He noted
that some countries allow local officials to implement laws that
safeguard individual liberty.'6 2 Although our Constitution is both
politically and structurally different from those of European
countries, Justice Breyer believed such a comparison would shed
light upon the process of enabling a state to preserve its autonomy
while enforcing a federal program.'1 Justice Breyer concluded by
stating that the Constitution should be flexible enough to grant
Congress the power to enact any law it believes necessary to solve
a national problem.'6"
The issue of whether the federal government can require states
to enforce federally mandated programs arose during the 1970's
when the EPA imposed anti-pollution regulations requiring state
enforcement. 6 5 In Maryland v. EPA, 66 the state challenged the
(Madison).
158. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The Federalist No. 45
(Hamilton) (Hamilton stated that the "eventual collection [of the federal tax] under the
immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to
the rules, appointed by the several States."). Id. See also The FederalistNo. 36 (Hamilton)
(Hamilton stated that the federal government could "employ the State officers as much as
possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emolument."). Id.
159. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2404 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975);
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975). (The majority started its historical analysis with the EPA line of cases in the
1970's, while the dissent referred to Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)). Printz, 117 S. Ct.
2379, 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Even though, in its historical analysis, the majority did not distinguish cases until the
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EPA:s authority to enact programs requiring states to establish
bikeways, to re-evaluate the Baltimore Transportation Plan, and to
require retrofitting of pollution control devices aimed at certain
vehicle classes.1 67 The statute provides that states have the primary
responsibility for implementing and maintaining these air
standards.'16 The EPA also required states to implement EPA
standards including: emission limitations, compliance schedules for
each standard, and other measures necessary to achieve and
maintain the standards. 6 9 The district court did not permit a delay
in submitting the plans; Maryland filed its plan, which the court
later rejected. 170 In response, the EPA imposed its regulations upon
Maryland.' 7' Maryland subsequently sought to enjoin the
72
regulations.'
A second EPA enforcement case arose in Brown v. EPA, 73 in
which California was required to submit a state plan to implement,
maintain, and enforce air quality standards that included land use
and transportation controls. 74 California submitted its plan, which
7
the EPA Administrator approved in part, and rejected in part.
California then revised its plan, which the Administrator again
1970's, there is an earlier case that is relevant to the issue of whether the Court has held that
the federal government can require states to enforce a federal law. See Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860) overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
In 1860, in deciding whether the Extradition Act of 1793 could force a Governor from an.
asylum state to return a fugitive to the forum state, the Dennison Court held that the
Constitution did not grant the federal government the power to impose any duty upon a
state officer and compel him to perform that duty. Dennison, 65 U.S. at 107-08. In 1987, the
Branstad Court was once again confronted with the Extradition Act of 1793, but this time,
the Court held that "basic constitutional principles" can require a state officer to perform
duties arising from the Constitution, and these officers can be compelled to perform such
duties. Branstad,483 U.S. at 227-28. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
166. 530 F2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975).
167. Maryland, 530 F.2d at 217-18. The EPA based its authority on the Clean Air Act,
as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. section 1857 (1955), which provides that the Administrator of the
EPA shall publish national air quality standards for pollutants that the EPA has determined
to be harmful to public health and welfare. Id. at 218. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-3 (1955).
168. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 c-2 (1955).
169. See id. § 1857 c-5(a)2(B) (1955). The statute also included a provision allowing the
EPA to accept or reject the state's plan, and upon the latter, to issue its own implementation
plan for the Area. Id.
170. Maryland, 530 F2d at 217.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 521 E2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
174. See also Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)B, and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (West
Supp. 1975).
175. Brown, 521 F2d at 829.
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rejected in part, and promulgated a transportation control plan. 176
Following the EPAs action, the state and others petitioned the
Ninth Circuit to review the regulations.'7 7 The Supreme Court held
that the federal government could not impose legislation upon a
state that required the state to ensure compliance with the enacted
provisions.178
In District of Columbia v. Train, 79 Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia sought to enjoin the EPA's "transportation
control" regulations that were initiated pursuant to the Clean Air
Act's National Capital Interstate Air Quality Control Region
provision. 80 The committee and the EPA jointly established
measures that added buses to the regional fleet, created reversible
and exclusive express bus lanes, as well as inspection and
maintenance programs, established bicycle lanes, and mandated
vehicle retrofit programs.18i After the programs were established,
the petitioners sought to enjoin enforcement of the regulations. 8 2
Before the Court could review the constitutional issue, the EPA
rescinded the regulations and the Court vacated the opinions. 183
Six years later, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n Inc., the Court addressed the question of
whether the federal government may compel states to implement
federal regulatory programs. 184 In Hodel, the plaintiffs brought a
pre-enforcement action challenging the constitutionality of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("Surface
Mining Act").ts 5 Congress designed the Surface Mining Act to
"establish a nationwide program to protect society and the
176. Id. The administrator's plan required: (1) reducing the amount of gasoline sold in
several regions, (2) operating an inspection and maintenance program, (3) imposing limits on
motorcycle use, (4) instituting an oxidating catalyst retrofit program, (5) controlling dry
cleaning solvent vapor losses, (6) imposing surcharges on parking spaces, (7) developing a
system designed to review and approve construction and modification of parking facilities,
(8) establishing a computer aided car pool matching system, and (9) adding preferential bus
and car pool lanes. Id. at 830.
177. Id. at 827.
178. Id.
179. 521 F2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
180. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5. (1955). See also 38 Fed. Reg. 33702 (Dec. 6, 1973).
Various governmental units created an Air Quality Planning Committee to establish a
transportation control plan. Train, 521 F.2d at 978.
181. Train, 521 E2d at 979.
182. Id. at 971.
183. Brown v. EPA, 521 F2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
184. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
185. Id. See 30 U.C.S.A. § 1201 (1977).
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186
environment from [the] adverse effects of surface coal mining."
To accomplish its goals, the Surface Mining Act established interim
and permanent provisions requiring states to immediately enforce
federal standards. 8 7 The statute also allowed states to pursue their
own programs during the interim phase, during which time they
could assist the Secretary in enforcing the federal standards.'ls The
Hodel Court ruled that the Surface Mining Act's provisions were
constitutional because the federal government did not compel the
states to administer federal law, and further, that the Act made
compliance with the federal standards voluntary. If the state did
not wish to implement regulations that mirrored those in the
Surface Mining Act, then the burden of enforcement was placed
89
solely upon the federal government.
Whether the federal government may compel states to implement
federal programs was again addressed by the Court in FERC v.
Mississippi.10 In FERC, Mississippi challenged the constitutional
validity of Titles I and III, as well as Title II, section 210, of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, ("PURPA'). 191 Titles I
186. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (1976 ed. Supp. Ill § 102(a)).
187. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268-69. To enforce the provisions, the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") was created, whereby the Secretary of the Interior,
acting through the OSM, has the responsibility to implement, enforce, and administer
regulatory provisions contained in Title V of the Act. Id. See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(c) and
1211(c) (1976 ed. Supp. III) § 102(a). See also 91 Stat. 467-514, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1279 (1976
ed. Supp. III, § 102(a); 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 501 and 1251 (1976 ed. Supp. III). Title V establishes
both interim and permanent phases that call for the immediate promulgation and federal
enforcement of performance standards. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1279 (1976 ed. Supp. ImI,
§ 102(a)). The interim performance standards include:
1. Returning the land to the same condition prior to mining,
2. Restoring the land to its approximate original contour,
3. Segregating and preserving topsoil,
4. Minimizing the disturbance to the hydrological balance,
5. Using coal mine waste piles for dams and embankments,
6. Re-vegetating mined areas, and
7. Disposing of soil.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 269. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b) (1976 ed. Supp. M) § 102(a). Until the
permanent federal program is implemented in each state, the Secretary is in charge of
enforcing and inspecting the established state programs.. Hodel, 452 U.S. 270. See 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1252 (1977).
188. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 270. Even though the states can assist the Secretary, they are
not required to enforce the federal standards; likewise, the federal government may not
intervene in enforcing regulatory programs implemented by a state. Id. See 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1253 (1978) (giving the state exclusive jurisdiction). See also 30 U.S.C.A § 1252(e)(4)
(establishing financial reimbursement to states that assist the federal government during the
interim phase). Id.
189. Hodet, 452 U.S. at 288.
190. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
191. FERC, 456 U.S. at 745. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (1978).
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and III established regulatory policies for electricity and national
gas providers that were administered by the Secretary of Energy,
encouraging state adoption of retail regulatory practices. 92 Titles I
and III also required state utility regulatory commissions and
non-regulated utilities to "consider" the implementation of PURPA:s
regulatory standards. 193 Section 210 of Title II required state utility
commissions to settle disputes arising under the statute. 194 The
Court concluded that Titles I and EmI did not compel states to
enforce federal laws, rather, the statutes. only asked states to
consider the federal standards. 19 5 The Court characterized Title II,
section 210, as a regulation that only required states to regulate
96
disputes, and did not compel states to enforce a federal program.
The next opportunity the Court had to decide whether Congress
is authorized to compel states to enforce federal law arose in New
York v. United States.197 In New York, the Court reviewed three
incentive provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 aimed at encouraging states to comply
with a federal statute that required states to take responsibility for
the disposal of state-generated waste by specific deadlines. 98 The
first provision was a monetary incentive that established an escrow
account supervised by the Secretary of Energy. 9 9 The second
provision was an access incentive that gave states without disposal
sites the choice of either regulating waste disposal in accordance
with federal standards or denying disposal to their residents. 20 The
192. FERC, 456 U.S. at 746. Titles I and LI were implemented to encourage: (1)
conservation of energy supplied by. . .utilities"; (2) "the optimization of the efficiency of
use of facilities and resources by . . . utilities systems"; and (3) "equitable rates to
consumers." Id. See also 15 U.S.C.A § 3201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (establishing retail policies
for natural gas utilities) and 16 U.S.C.A § 2611 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (establishing retail
policies for electric utilities).
193. FERC, 456 U.S. at 746.
194. Id. at 760.
195. Id. at 764.
196. Id. at 760. The Court held that Mississippi's role in dispute resolution did not
require the state to enforce a federal program but was merely an adjudicating activity that
the state's Public Service Commission customarily engaged in. Id. (citing Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 77-1-31, 77-3-5, 77-3-13(3), 77-3-21, and 77-3405 (1973)).
197. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
198. New York, 505 U.S. at 149. See 42 U.S.C.A_ § 2021b (1985).
199. New York, 505 U.S. at 152. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(d)(2)(A) (1985); 42 U.S.C.A§§ 2021e(d)(1)(A), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(i), 2021e(e)(1)(B), and 2021e(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1985). (The
Secretary of Energy takes one-fourth of the surcharges from sited states and then makes
payments to states that comply with the act's deadlines.).
200. New York, 505 U.S. at 153. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(e)(2)(A) (1985). See also 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2021e(e)(2)(B), 2021e(e)(2)(C), 2021e(e)(1)(D), and 2021e(e)(2)(D) (1985).
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third incentive was a "take title" provision requiring a state that
generates waste, but is unable to dispose of it, to take title to that
waste and become liable for all damages resulting from the
waste. 20 New York had not entered into a regional pact, but
enacted legislation to finance and establish a disposal site within
20 2
its borders.
Five sites were identified, but citizens of the targeted sites
opposed having the site in their community.2°3 In response to the
citizens' refusal to accept a waste site, New York and the targeted
counties sought to declare the act unconstitutional. 2 4 The Court
ruled that the monetary incentives were conditional grants to the
states, and that the access incentives were "simple regulation[s]"
within Congressional authority. 20 5 With respect to the "take title"
provision, the Court found this to be outside Congress' enumerated
powers and an infringement upon state sovereignty under the Tenth
2°
Amendment.
In analyzing whether the federal government can force a state to
implement a federal program, the Printz Court reviewed the
structure of the Constitution, the Framers' intent, and Court
precedent. 207 Following a detailed analysis, the Court held that the
Brady Act's interim provisions, requiring state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential
handgun owners, were unconstitutional. 20 8 On a broader scale, the
Court has also determined that the federal government cannot
require a state employee to enforce a federal program. 20 9
The Printz Court extended the holding of New York to strike
down a federal regulation that required state chief law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on potential handgun
purchasers. 210 The Printz decision holds that federal legislation
compelling state officials to execute federal laws is an
unconstitutional infringement upon a state's Tenth Amendment
sovereignty. 21' In New York v. United States, the Court held that the
201. New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1985)).
202. Id. at 154.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 173.
206. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
207. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370 (1997).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2365.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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federal government cannot require states to enforce federal laws. 212
Following the precedent of New York, the Printz Court has further
restricted the federal government's ability to require a state or the
state's officials to enforce federal regulations.
Although the Court found that earlier statutes required states to
enforce a federal program, the Court held that these intrusions
upon state sovereignty were permissible.21 3 In analyzing the
commandeering statutes, the Court held that states could enforce a
federal program as long as the states were asked, compensated, or
already performing a function similar to that posed by the federal
214
law.
Although the Court's historical review began with the EPA line of
cases, the Court first recognized the federal government's inability
to require states to implement a federal program in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.2 15 The Hodel
Court held that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 was constitutional because the federal government did not
compel states to adopt regulations aimed at mitigating adverse
effects from surface coal mining, but merely made the enforcement
of the regulations voluntary and compensated the states for
enforcement. 2 16 In the present case, Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence, stated that the interim provisions would be
constitutional if the enforcement were voluntary.21 7
Similarly, the FERC Court held that the state's role in enforcing
Title H, section 210 of PURPA, (using a state court to hear the
case), was an activity already performed by the state and did not
constitute forcing a state into federal service. 2 8 In addition, the
Court held that Titles I and III did not compel states to enforce a
federal law, but merely asked the states to consider the law.219
212. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142 (1992).
213. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2375-76. (The Court held that although there were executive
commandeering statutes requiring states to implement a federal law, these statutes were
enforced by the states in return for federal funding grants and in response to federal
requests for assistance.). See Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§2, 4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882); and
Proclamation of May 18, 1917, ch.15, § 6, 40 Stat. 1665 (1917).
214. See Proclamation of May 18, 1917, ch.15, § 6, 40 Stat. 1665 (1917) (President
Wilson requesting state assistance in enforcing the military draft); and Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957).
215. Printz, 117 U.S. at 2380.
216. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981).
217. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385.
218. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
219. Id. at 764.
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In New York, the Court held that the first two incentive
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1995 did impose a duty upon the states to enforce a federal
program, but were conditional grants to persuade the states to
perform the enforcement duties. 220 However, the Court ruled that
the third provision (the "take title" provision) was unconstitutional,
due to its interference with the state's Tenth Amendment right of
sovereignty. 221 The Printz Court relied on New York and, therefore,
held that the Brady Act interim provisions, requiring state CLEOs
to perform background checks on potential handgun owners, were
unconstitutional.22 2 Despite the earlier decisions by the Court
holding that the federal government cannot require a state to
implement a federal regulation, the decisions in these earlier cases
have delineated situations in which it is permissible for the federal
government to require states to enforce a federal law. These
exceptions to the general rule of the Tenth Amendment have
created a system in which the federal government is thrust into a
position where it must get state approval or acceptance before its
laws are either enforced or followed, when the law compels state
officials to enforce a federal regulation.
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia cited the American system
of "dual sovereignty" - that there is a line drawn between the
federal and state governments that prevent one from intruding
upon the rights of the other.22 3 Taking a different view, Justice
Stevens argued in his dissent that Senators are likely to make laws
that benefit their own constituents and as such, are in a position to
make laws that could burden officials of other states in an effort to
22 4
benefit their own people.
Justice Stevens posed the question of whether the American
system of government, as envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution, is, indeed, a system of "dual sovereignty." If the
political process works as Justice Stevens believes it should, then a
federal regulation requiring state execution to fulfill the law's
purpose would not be an unconstitutional intrusion on state
sovereignty.
The majority analyzed the intent of the Framers, finding that they
would not require states to enforce a federal program. Instead, the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992).
Id. at 188.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
Id. at 2377. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Steven, J., dissenting).
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majority reasoned that the Framers believed states would assist the
federal government in reaching its objectives. In his rebuttal to the
majority's opinion, Justice Souter recounted Alexander Hamilton's
argument that a state would aid federal directives as an auxiliary
function, rather than implementing its own choices. 225 If Justice
Souter's rationale is followed, and the states perform duties as an
auxiliary function, then state enforcement of federal laws would
not be discretionary.
Since the Court has previously held that the federal government
cannot require states to enforce federal laws, the burden on an
already strained federal bureaucracy to enforce federal laws will
markedly increase. Currently, the federal government can impose
federal laws upon the states if the laws further the Constitution.
The federal government cannot require the states or their officials
to enforce such laws, however.
America's founding fathers met in Philadelphia at the
Constitutional Convention of 1781 to revise the Articles of
Confederation. The Framers realized that the Articles of
Confederation lacked the authority needed to operate a centralized
government. In an effort to meet both state and federal needs, the
fifty-five men attending the Convention created and adopted a
governing plan ceding a great amount of what had formerly been
state authority to the federal government, while still reserving some
powers to the states.
Printz effectively takes back some powers previously delegated
to Congress and shifts some of the weight of governing back to the
states. Although the Court has not completely abandoned the
concept that the federal government can require a state to enforce
a federal program, the federal government must get permission
from the state, or compensate the state in some way, before
22 6
execution can occur.
The Printz Court expanded the scope of its holding in New York.
After Printz, it is unconstitutional for a state employee to be
compelled to enforce a federal regulatory provision. Printz holds
that the federal government cannot circumvent state sovereignty by
directly legislating the actions of state employees. Now,
enforcement of a federal law that requires a state or state
employee to assist in its execution will be left to the discretion of
225. Id. at 2403 (Souter, J., dissenting). See The FederalistNo. 27 (Hamilton).
226. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142, 173
(1992).
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the several states. The decision in Printz pronounces that any
federal law that the federal government, alone, cannot enforce, no
matter the urgency of the measures or the law's duration, will not
be automatically enforceable. To ensure a system of government
that meets the needs of the people, the decision in Printz should
be altered to allow the Constitution to "have a little play in the
joints,"227 as Justice Holmes suggested, and be interpreted flexibly
enough to allow Congress to pass laws that it "believe[s] necessary
228
to solve an important national problem."
Michael L. Johnson

227. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2397 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bain Peanut Co. of Texas
v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)).
228. Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

